<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Detection-as-Code on CybersecurityOS</title><link>http://www.cybersecurityos.net/tags/detection-as-code/</link><description>Recent content in Detection-as-Code on CybersecurityOS</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 14:30:01 -0500</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="http://www.cybersecurityos.net/tags/detection-as-code/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The Bottleneck Moved: Detection Engineering Heading Into 2027</title><link>http://www.cybersecurityos.net/posts/secops/detection-engineering-2027-bottleneck-moved/</link><pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>http://www.cybersecurityos.net/posts/secops/detection-engineering-2027-bottleneck-moved/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Twenty-two seconds. That&amp;rsquo;s the median time, per Mandiant&amp;rsquo;s M-Trends 2026, for initial access to be handed off from one threat actor to the next. One crew gets in. Another takes over.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now look at your queue. An alert fires. It waits. Someone picks it up, pivots across four consoles, decides it&amp;rsquo;s probably the backup job again, and closes it. The rule worked. The detection still failed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That gap is the story of detection engineering heading into 2027. For a decade the constraint was signal creation. Could we write enough good rules, fast enough, across enough telemetry? That problem hasn&amp;rsquo;t gone away. But it&amp;rsquo;s no longer the binding constraint. The bottleneck moved to signal consumption: who or what investigates the alert, and how fast.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>